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Desmond King 
The American State and the Obama Presidency: 
A Preliminary Discussion 
Abstract: 
I characterize American State power as the expression of a “shock and awe” strategy, that is, the style of 
making dramatic policy pronouncements which centralise efforts and concentrate bureaucratic resources. 
Shock and awe,’ refers to the capacity of American state leaders to employ its sovereign power and am-
ple resources determinedly to a particular end. This capacity rebuffs the notion of the United States as a 
weak state. It describes how powerful the centralized exercise of (civilian and military) bureaucratic au-
thority bent on a single purpose has become in the US state. The state is the executive – the bureaucratic 
departments and agencies including the military controlled under presidential authority. Shock and awe 
is a strategy which presidents seek to employ definitively to address a crisis at home or abroad. It is dis-
tinctly American because of the constraints – including constitutional, political and electoral – under 
which the executive pursues policy and responds to crises. 
 
Keywords: American state, executive, Obama, shock and awe, Tea Party 
1. The nature of American State power 
In this essay I characterize American State power as the expression of a “shock and awe” 
strategy, that is, the style of making dramatic policy pronouncements which centralise ef-
forts and concentrate bureaucratic resources. Examples of this approach since the Second 
World War include President Barack Obama’s jobs speech to Congress on 8 September 
2011 recommending his American Jobs Bill, President George W Bush’s emergency leg-
islation to bail out Wall Street, the $800 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
and in earlier periods President Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty and President Jimmy 
Carter’s declaration of a policy to reduce America’s consumption of energy as the moral 
equivalent of a war. ‘Shock and awe,’ refers to the capacity of American state leaders to 
employ its sovereign power and ample resources determinedly to a particular end. This 
capacity rebuffs the notion of the United States as a weak state. It describes how powerful 
the centralized exercise of (civilian and military) bureaucratic authority bent on a single 
purpose has become in the US state. The state is the executive – the bureaucratic depart-
ments and agencies including the military controlled under presidential authority. Shock 
and awe is a strategy which presidents seek to employ definitively to address a crisis at 
home or abroad. It is distinctly American because of the constraints – including constitu-
tional, political and electoral – under which the executive pursues policy and responds to 
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crises. And it is often a means of overwhelming and side tracking local obstacles to ex-
pressions of national public authority. 
This centralized bureaucratic and military capacity is a long distance from the hidden 
or nascent nineteenth century American state.1 The early American polity was not a com-
plete state as it is recognized to be today because it had such an undeveloped administra-
tive arm. The U.S. Constitution barely mentions administration and early amendments to 
the Constitution emphasize rights of citizen (notably that of bearing arms) that in some 
ways conflicted with a state notionally holding a monopoly on the use of violence – a 
core state function. But over time administrative capacity grew2 and by the middle of the 
twentieth century that capacity includes extensive regulation and policing, growing social 
welfare programs and the building of a substantial professional military. Constructing, 
testing and using the first nuclear mass bomb on Hiroshima epitomized these expansive 
features of the American state, signalling a new era of capacity. 
Any president making policy with American state capacity faces a compelling and re-
curring constraint:3citizens of the United States favour limited government (see Lynn in 
this issue). Belief in a small national state has prevailed among both voters and elites 
since the Republic’s creation. Countless surveys of public opinion document this prefer-
ence.4 Two public administration scholars characterize a brief period between the late 
1930s and early 1960s as the state’s “administrative heyday – a time when government 
and administration were held in high popular esteem, trusted, and enjoyed bipartisan sup-
port.” 5 This positive view was short lived. Through the 1970s and 1980s hostility to gov-
ernment grew as did declining trust in national institutions. As a stance toward govern-
ment the opposition to ‘big government’ has grown since the presidential election in 2008 
galvanized under the Tea Party umbrella: 77 of the 87 new GOP House members elected 
in November 2010 for instance gather under the Republican Study Committee a conser-
vative grouping united around shared Tea Movement sympathies such as reducing federal 
deficits and opposing the rise of ‘big government.’ This expression of populist opposition 
to government action is cyclical. President Ronald Reagan famously declared that “gov-
ernment is the problem” not the means with which Americans can address enduring prob-
lems, challenging many of his predecessors’ actions such as presidents Johnson and 
Nixon.6 Although a sentiment widely embraced and celebrated by the Republican Party 
nonetheless Reagan’s intellectual heir President George W Bush left office in 2008 after a 
notable expansion of federal spending.  
But, and without paradox, Americans even conservative ones, look to this same ide-
ally limited government for responses to crises and emergencies. Following the devasta-
tion of Alabama and six other states by tornadoes on 28 April 2011, President Barack 
Obama assured the survivors that “I want every American who has been affected by this 
disaster to know that the federal government will do everything we can to help you re-
cover, and we will stand with you as you rebuild.” Formulating such responses, policy 
makers highlight the need for state action – not acting merely from blind ambition but to 
persuade reluctant voters of the seriousness of the problem. The strategy of shock and 
awe then unfolds. In due course populist discontent and anti-government sentiment 
pushes these policies backward and the state withdraws. A new cycle of crisis and re-
sponse gives us the American state as a powerful recurring presence in US politics. The 
Tea Movement is unremarkable historically in this cycle, as the Occupy Wall Street pro-
test may prove to be too. 
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The Great Recession (2007-08) illustrates both the appeal to presidents of deploying 
state power and voter ambivalence about such exercises of executive power. The almost 
daily government responses to the US’s financial crisis in the fall 2008 show the modern 
American state dramatically at work. On 25 November alone, in their diet of ‘shock and 
awe’ measures,7 the US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve chairman 
Ben Bernanke announced a lending program providing up to $800 billion. This program 
underwrote securities backed by car loans, student loans, credit card debt and small busi-
ness loans8 and financed buying up debt tied to home loans guaranteed by the govern-
ment agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.9 On 18 March 2009 the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, announced a massive expenditure of three hundred bil-
lion dollars purchasing US government debt, raising the Fed’s balance sheet to over $3 
trillion. One newspaper columnist looked on in shock and awe at this exercise in shock 
and awe.10 In November 2009 Fed Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke ruminated that “I 
honestly believe that September and October of 2008 was the worst financial crisis in 
global history, including the Great Depression;” and confirmed that 12 of the country’s 
13 most important financial institutions faced collapse: “so out of the maybe 13 most im-
portant financial institutions in the United States, 12 were at risk of failing within a pe-
riod of a week or two.”11 A year later, Chairman Bernanke committed the Fed to an ex-
tended quantitative easing intervention into the financial markets. The scale of Federal 
Reserve support to banks internationally at the peak of the September-December 2008 
crisis became public two years later, showing this institution to be a global lender of last 
resort – in effect shock and awe abroad. 
Pumping billions of dollars of loans, buy outs and guarantees into the US economy to 
shore up the financial sector was conceived of as a short gap measures. But such Ameri-
can state largesse was also a logical culmination of a half century of activist State expan-
sion.12 
Shock and awe strategies are not necessarily successful as long term solutions to deep 
problems – as the continuous war on drugs reveals. And it is not demonstrated efficacy 
and policy solution that executives draw on the American State’s shock and awe capaci-
ties. It is to be in a position to demonstrate leadership and initiative, and to intimidate ad-
versaries that the idea of dramatic announcement and concentrated resource deployment 
is drawn upon by presidents. 
2. Why shock and awe developed 
Three major factors explain and define the development of the shock and awe strategy in 
the US polity. 
2.1 State capacity  
The first is the exceptional capacities of the American State as they have developed since 
mid-twentieth century. These capacities cover several dimensions – fiscal, military, bu-
reaucratic, ideological, rhetorical, cultural and economic. 
American presidents have fiscal, bureaucratic, military and policy resources in their 
command and authority arising from electoral legitimation. Executive authority is also 
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deployed. They can issue executive orders and in ‘signing agreements’ stipulate a particu-
lar meaning of legislative intent often contrary to that intended by the bill’s sponsors. 
Certainly many of the measures undertaken in different parts of the American State rely 
on congressional appropriations and rest under congressional oversight (and ultimately 
judicial review13). But as an architectural inheritance expanded and controlled by the ex-
ecutive and administrators since the 1940s, the American State is vast. It is the executive 
which employs and deploys these resources. 
These capacities are best understood as distinct streams of resources within the ex-
ecutive forming in effect mini-states. Different ‘states’ categorise familiar government ac-
tivities but differentiate them as distinct spheres within the executive-led State. The mili-
tary state encompasses the sixteen agency intelligence sector built since 1946, regularly 
reorganized most recently after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and the civil defence 
program built up during the Cold War decades as well as the conventional military per-
sonnel and hardware resources. These are executive controlled. The activist state extends 
over the most familiar notions of ‘government’, the regulatory state, the employment of 
bureaucracy to deliver public policy programs, the numerous tax expenditure measures 
variously termed the invisible or submerged state,14 and the criminal justice system where 
congressional legislation imposing prison terms in a defined way has created a punitive 
carceral state with high numbers of prisoners compared with other countries.15 Mimicking 
war like mobilization to achieve domestic goals is the main characteristic of the quasi-
war state. Such initiatives as the war on poverty in the 1960s and the militarisation of the 
policy since the 1990s to exclude illegal immigrants illustrate this dimension of the 
American state; the transfer of military policy principles to domestic policy is a further 
aspect of this state activity discussed in Jennifer Light’s study of urban policy in Cold 
War America.16 Fiscal activity and resources are standard fare for any state17 and the 
American executive is no different in developing and expanding spending, often funded 
through deficits, and taxing regimes. It is distinct in the scale of deficit spending which 
can be undertaken because of the status of the dollar as the global reserve currency and 
the depth of money markets (especially in New York) based on the dollar.18 The scale of 
this resource is demonstrated by the Fed Reserve and Treasury Department’s scheme, in 
October 2008 to rescue the financial sector. Working together under George W Bush’s 
delegation, the two agencies received an agreed $700 billion fund, the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), from Congress with which to prop up the US’s ailing financial 
institutions in a shock and awe response.19 As the global leader of democratic values and 
Western interests the executive dominated American state has a powerful and influential 
foreign presence. In addition to its role in coordinating or leading military actions, the 
American state created an extensive garrison presence globally after 1945,20 and articu-
lated democratic beliefs under both Republican and Democrat presidents – as George W 
Bush’s speech in China in 2005 and Barack Obama’s in Cairo 2009 each illustrates. 
Global leadership by the executive is often of a shock and awe type. President George W 
Bush’s declaration of a war on terrorism after the September 2001 Al-Qaeda led attacks 
on the Pentagon and New York is such an instance. Invading Iraq in 2003 had this char-
acter too. 
The relationship between these tributaries and shock and awe executive action is dy-
namic and mostly reinforcing. Not all these tributaries of the American state result from 
shock and awe initiatives; nor are they all constantly expanded or renewed through such 
concentrated policy onslaughts. But few of these American state activities have been im-
The American State and the Obama Presidency: A Preliminary Discussion 273 
mune since the 1940s from periodic shock and awe executive attention which galvanizes 
expansion and development. 
2.2 Executive power 
A second force driving the use of shock and awe strategies in the American state is the 
growth of executive power since the 1940s. This growth has occurred especially in the 
contexts of crises. How crises – military or domestic – drive state expansion is crucial to 
understanding the American State structures inherited by President Obama.  
Accounts of American state expansion documenting the military and domestic shocks 
provoking such growth underplay how much these efforts were driven by and centred on 
the executive not the other branches. Legislation such as the Administrative Procedure 
Act in practice enhanced rather than limited executive authority, scholars Posner and 
Vermeule contend, because of the many legal “black holes” and presidential exemptions 
from legal requirements they create. The two scholars add: “the scope of these exemp-
tions waxes and wanes with circumstances, expanding during emergencies and contract-
ing during normal times, but it is never trivial, and the administrative state has never been 
brought wholly under the rule of law; periodically the shackles slip off altogether.”21 
‘Emergencies’ equates to crises. 
The upshot of administrative development during the Progressive era and its institu-
tionalization in the 1946 Act is a distinctive state in Hamilton and Sutton’s view: “Ameri-
can social and legal thinkers did not accept the European characterization of organiza-
tions and nation building, and attempted to replace these formal qualities of bureaucracy 
with substantive ones: rules were not justified by hierarchy, but by the immanent contours 
of the process of social life; obedience arose not from discipline, but from persuasion.”22 
This configuration helps explain the development of shock and awe type strategies as 
responses to crises. Centralized administrative and political authority is not as weak in the 
US as often assumed; nonetheless engaging in determinedly policy focused action neces-
sitates either being able to cite a crisis of such proportion that it can’t be ignored or or-
chestrating crisis-like circumstances around a specific problem. The strength of agencies 
constituting the American state also illustrates a key proactive element in executive use of 
American state shock and awe resources. Crisis action quite clearly implies a responsive 
mode and therefore describing a circumstance as of crisis proportions is often politically 
valuable to incumbents of the executive. 
National state power is therefore in effect executive power. The political executive – 
the presidency and its rich bureaucratic and administrative resources – decides upon the 
deployment of legitimate force and the expansion of legitimate policy measures and 
government power. As legal scholars Posner and Vermeule point out, “in the administra-
tive state, it is not the case that legislatures govern, even subject to constraints and the 
need for cooperation with other branches. Rather the executive governs, in the sense that 
it drives the policy agenda even where the cooperation of other branches is needed for 
political reasons.”23 In driving the ‘policy agenda,’ resort to shock and awe measures 
especially during periods of crisis is crucial. A vivid instance of executive authority 
comes from President Franklin D Roosevelt, a pioneering state builder of augmented 
central authority. In the pursuit of radical and innovative economic measures Roosevelt 
faced a potentially intransigent Congress in 1933. Speaking after being sworn in as 
274 Desmond King 
president, Roosevelt invoked a military metaphor to be embraced by all his successors: 
if Congress failed to convene, “’I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instru-
ment to meet the crisis – broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, 
as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign 
foe.’”24 
2.3 The state as a resource 
The third way of thinking about the American state as instrument through which shock 
and awe measures can be driven is to recognize how this ability enables executive to use 
the state as a resource rather than being overwhelmed by the ‘hapless giant’ tendency of 
the US bureaucracy.25 For executives controlling the American state it is a dependent 
rather than independent variable.  
Even with a delimitation of the state to the executive it is clear that many agencies of-
ten conflict in their respective views and values. But what an executive focused approach 
to the aggregation of these units explains is the mobilization of these agencies toward a 
common object in a period of crisis.26 Shared emphasis does not mean inter-agency con-
flicts vanish but it does put limits on their salience for key periods and events which have 
significance for the state’s endurance and construction of legitimacy. The significant 
challenges to the executive state’s capacities and powers are more likely to come from 
other parts of the separated system – Congress for instance – than from within its own 
functioning. The August 2011 budget and debt ceiling debacle – when agreement to raise 
the national debt level came only at the very final hour and after one credit rating agency 
downgraded US debt - illustrates this point. 
The executive-led expansion of the American state after 1940 unfolded through over-
lapping but distinct streams which built up collectively the capacities of the state as an in-
strument of presidential power. The Second World War and ensuing Cold War powered a 
military and emergency state itself with two sub strands – military power and intelligence 
agencies. Second, building upon but consolidating the New Deal era27, federal govern-
ment activism extended to an expanding litany of domestic policies.28 This activism con-
tinues.29 Third, the idea of state power as a tool of presidential policy making and leader-
ship imbued White House rhetoric, pronouncements, designs and strategy. Following 
Franklin Roosevelt’s lead the rhetoric of war on domestic inanimate foes such as poverty 
or crime seized presidential speech writers’ and advisers’ imagination as a standard in-
gredient in major presidential declarations and speeches.30 Strategically such combative 
language signalled to government officials a distinct policy focus to which resources 
should be directed and imparted elbow power in struggles over scarce funds. A recent in-
stance is the way in which US policy toward the prevention of illegal immigrant entry 
across the US-Mexican border has developed under the administrations of Bill Clinton, 
George W Bush and Barack Obama, very different presidents.  
Since the middle of the twentieth century presidents recognize in the American state 
an activist and interventionist system of governance, a recognition exploited as much by 
Republican presidents like Richard Nixon and George W Bush as by Democrats such as 
Lyndon Johnson and Bill Clinton. This enlarged presence includes not just the reasonably 
observable changes in taxing, spending and regulating in the United States – thereby re-
making through ‘a great transformation’ the US state into ‘an activist state’ for one lead-
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ing political scientist31 – but extends to deploying legitimate national authority for de-
mocratic nation building, defence and against internal if recondite ‘enemies’ such as ille-
gal drug users or illegal immigrants, and to social policies such as education (see Mätzke 
in this issue) . The parameters of legitimate state authority and activism grew. 
The exercise of ‘shock and awe’ executive leadership significantly drives the growth 
of the American State in a political culture hostile to government activism. In some re-
spects a weak political institution, the presidency,32 can nonetheless be directed by skilful 
incumbents in concentrated bursts of action against generalized problems often called 
enemies such as poverty or illegal immigrants or more obviously against measurable 
threats such as war. For some scholars this capacity makes for an ‘imperial presidency’ 
but such a characterization over personalizes the phenomenon of executive power and 
underestimates the wider sources of state growth propelling an augmented executive ad-
ministrative presence in American society. In fact the ‘shock and awe’ strategy as devel-
oped by presidents is a response to the distinctive if familiar understanding of where the 
executive is located constitutionally. A federal political system with institutionalized and 
entrenched horizontal and vertical divisions of power (see Lynn in this issue) the United 
States’ founding fathers acceded reluctantly to the necessity of centralized national au-
thority, and even then placed constitutional and judicial limits on any central concentra-
tion of resources. The United States can often appear consequently as a ‘stateless’ soci-
ety33 compared with others in the family of advanced democratic nations including even 
other federal systems such as Canada or Germany.34 
Thus American central power is exercised by the executive on many occasions: to 
wage war, to galvanize or control social and economic change, to revoke or to institute 
rights, to impose public order, to empower Americans against foreign threats or to van-
quish inanimate foes such as poverty. Whether these campaigns succeed or are appropri-
ate is of course routinely contested, a dispute fuelling the US’s polarized partisan politics, 
about which more below.35 The motive for such political initiatives is both reactive (or 
crisis driven) and proactive – for example, when Presidents seize the initiative to outline a 
plethora of ‘shock and awe’ measures to vanquish a salient foe.  
Both this mimicking of war strategy and reactive measures are comprehensible in the 
institutional, electoral and political incentives structuring presidential decision making 
and actions. These incentives transformed what began as a dramatic but pragmatic re-
sponse to war time crisis in the Pacific – bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki – into an in-
creasingly routinized strategy.  
Thus strategies of shock and awe rest fundamentally in the institutional division of 
authority across the presidency, congress and Supreme Court and in the widespread con-
sensus among Americans about that state’s claim to have a monopoly of legitimate force. 
The way in which the monopoly on legitimate force developed enabled the American 
State to acquire expansive powers of intervention for ‘short shock’ episodes. All states 
claim a monopoly of legitimate coercive powers and prohibit private militias. This com-
mon feature of state power assumed deeper political significance in the United States be-
cause – once it was established despite the constitutional protection to citizens’ bearing 
arms - it is used to legitimate a wider range of actions; because bureaucratic powers were 
less developed, the authority provided by a legitimate exercise of violence acquired 
greater salience. It structured for instance nineteenth century power against Native 
Americans.36 Consequently and despite the preference of many Americans for a small 
government and a proscribed state, in fact the United States now has a large national state 
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– but equally important a proclivity by presidents to employ national authority on a sys-
tematic and large scale for problem solving. 
3. President Obama and Shock and Awe after 2009. 
President Barack Obama’s incumbency of the American State has been trammelled by 
three major developments in US politics. First, entrenched and intensified partisan ideo-
logical polarization. Second, the rise of the populist anti-government Tea Party, with 
some taints of racism (see Minkenberg in this issue), has injected an intensified anti-
statism into American politics, limiting the use of shock and awe measures. And third, the 
economic crisis – the depths of which were not fully grasped by policy makers in 2008-
09 but which is now recognized as a long term and entrenched structural crisis in produc-
tion, demand and employment rather than merely an intensified cyclical recession. 
These fetters on the deployment of American state resources have not stopped Presi-
dent Obama attempting to resort to big government as a means of achieving ends. He suc-
cessfully passed a stimulus package in the spring 2009 and in 2010 his health care reform 
– the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act - was enacted.37 But the administration 
has had increasingly to grapple with a profound structural (not cyclical) economic crisis 
in a context of Tea Party influenced resistance of any use of policy instruments such as 
spending or stimulus packages. 
Obama has continued nonetheless to seek to use the American state in a shock and 
awe fashion. This can be illustrated with the pursuit of the American Jobs Bill in Septem-
ber 2011. 
3.1 Announcing the Jobs Bill: Fighting the Economic “Emergency”. 
First, President Obama presented this idea in classic shock and awe fashion – a dramatic 
televised speech to a joint session of Congress, focused on a single issue (employment 
creation), with a repeated message to ‘pass this bill.’ Both in rhetoric and detail he pitches 
the bill as a measure all parties should pass – offering a specificity of tax increases and 
itemized exemptions on the wealthy as the means to fund it.  
It is not as large as the April 2009 $787 billion stimulus package but at a proposed 
$447 billion the jobs bill is far from trivial. The bill proposes spending $240 billion on 
employer and employee payroll tax cuts, designed to encourage hiring, $140 billion on 
infrastructure and extends both unemployment benefits and business tax-relief for new 
investment. It will be funded by raising taxes – households earning over $200k and $250k 
per annum (2 per cent of taxpayers, about 3 million households) will lose itemized deduc-
tions (such as mortgage relief) and the reduction of certain tax benefits/reliefs enjoyed by 
corporations.38 And under the so-called Buffet rule – named after the billionaire busi-
nessman Warren Buffet – there is a proposed tax on millionaires. Such proposals will be 
aided by the developing grass roots Occupy Wall Street protest movement. 
President Obama vigorously promoted his jobs bill across the nation urging voters to 
write Congress members in support of the measure. Adopting the common shock and awe 
strategy in his speeches the President has stressed the scale of crisis necessitating the en-
actment of his bill. He characterized the economic and labour market conditions as an 
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“emergency” and like such predecessors as Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald 
Reagan he has toured the country speaking in areas blighted by job losses. He told report-
ers: “what I’ve done over the last several weeks is to take the case to the American people 
so that they understand what’s at stake. It is now up to all the senators, and hopefully all 
the members of the House, to explain to their constituencies why they would be opposed 
to common-sense ideas that historically have been supported by Democrats and Republi-
cans in the past.”39 
Presenting the Jobs Bill 
Second, even delivery of his speech was marred by disrespect and partisan polarization. 
Having requested to deliver the speech 7th September, the GOP in the Congress led by 
Speaker John Boehner forced the White House to switch to Thursday 8th in order to avoid 
a clash with a Republican Party nominee hopefuls’ debate. This rebuff by the Congress is 
unprecedented historically. It shows the extent to which the executive needs to marshal 
dramatic capacities to achieve ends. 
While not massively welcomed by Republicans his speech and proposals got more 
positive noises than most of his bills. There may be some agreement on small aspects of 
the bill – notably payroll tax relief – but on fundamentals it will fail to be enacted. Indeed 
none of the proposals may succeed. 
This negative reception and pending legislative struggle reflects two aspects of 
American politics bearing down on the Obama administration. First, he coincides with the 
cyclical populist anti-government thread in US political culture. The cleavage about the 
size and role of the American state has rarely been as salient politically. Second, this anti-
statism is in part a manifestation of anti-Obamaism.40 This creates the third stage in the 
jobs bill initiative as an instance of pursuing shock and awe strategy. Announcement of a 
shock and awe policy does not guarantee enactment or efficacy. 
Jobs versus the anti-government Tea Party 
Third, this outcome is a consequence of the rise of a Tea Party movement which helped 
elect a majority of Republicans in the House in November 2010. Eighty five members of 
the House GOP belong to the Conservative Study Group; as the push to default America 
showed this movement believes it is almost a patriotic duty to take risks with the coun-
try’s well-being. This is an age of asymmetric polarization and as the noted journalist EJ 
Dionne Jr. writes “when your adversaries’ ideas are so dastardly, it’s better to court 
chaos, win a fight and pick up the pieces later.” This Tea Party influenced GOP has a 
“new sensibility linking radical individualism with a loathing for government that would 
shock Hamilton, Lincoln and Robert Taft. Thus the GOP sees the solution to the crisis in 
the measures its right wing has always favoured: gutting regulation; keeping taxes on the 
affluent low; cutting government programs; and stopping Ben Bernanke and the Fed from 
doing anything to put the unemployed back to work that might risk the tiniest bit of infla-
tion and thus deflate, even momentarily, the wealth of the already wealthy.”41 
But the hatred of Obama led Democratic policy to deal with the economic crisis goes 
deeper than mere partisan disagreement, even at the current severe levels of partisan divi-
sion. It reflects the racial structures influencing American political development since the 
nation’s creation, and reflected in government institutions and policy since the middle of 
the nineteenth century.42 Tea Party rallies are white. GOP candidate references to welfare 
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have racist connotations. The Orange County GOP officeholder who circulated an email 
showing Obama as a monkey expressed surprise that her caricature could be racist. Hav-
ing seen the historic election of an African American into the White House, the southern 
dominated Tea Party movement formed. Its struggle is against both the American state 
and the Obama White House incumbency. 
The Tea Party scored a remarkable success in the November 2010 mid-term elections, 
catapulting over 80 new Republican members into the House of Representatives. The 
movement was founded after the election of Barack Obama, America’s first African 
American president. Focused initially on hostility to government spending in general, the 
Tea Party gathered momentum as an ideological opposition to President Obama’s health 
care reform, enacted after months of struggle in July 2010.However this ideological dis-
tinctness masks a historically significant regional pattern to the GOP Tea Party represen-
tatives. The movement’s elected members are predominantly southern: in the House 39 
members come from the South, 23 from the other three regions combined. In percentage 
terms in the Tea Party caucus this translates into 63 per cent (South), 19 per cent (Mid-
west), 16 per cent (West) and 2 per cent (East). There are no representatives from New 
England states.  
What these roots of the Tea Party movement reveals is the extent to which its anti-
government spending strategy and opposition to a raised debt ceiling are not expressions of 
standard Republican conservatism but come from a distinct Southern ideological conserva-
tism. This conservatism was Democratic during the one-party segregationist era but is now 
Republican (with many former Democrat officeholders and voters changing party identifica-
tion). As a force in national politics this southern GOP faction favours tax cuts, privatizing 
entitlement programs and increasing tax expenditure relief on private schemes.  
This tendency toward intense ideological policy built in the 1980s and 1990s, spurred 
by the southern leadership of the GOP during Newt Gingrich’s period as House Speaker. 
Its success in the debt ceiling-budget agreement was the refusal to have any tax increases 
included in the August 9th outcome. This powerful anti-taxes, pro spending cuts Tea Party 
agenda has been inserted centrally in national politics. But is has now provoked a sort of 
opposition in the Occupy Wall Street protests. 
4. Conclusion: The Demise of the Shock and Awe State? 
President Obama’s effort to mobilise the American state’s resources in a shock and awe 
strategy to address mass unemployment is consistent with how this institution has devel-
oped and has been employed by executives since the Second World War through several 
decades of executive expansion and initiatives.43 
Why has this traditional use of the American state’s resources and authority proved to 
challenging to President Obama? The explanation lies in a threefold sequence some inde-
pendent or the Obama White House and some specific to this administration. 
First, shock and awe has been routinized and lost its dramatic edge. So many presi-
dents have declared war on inanimate or animate objects and deployed this rhetoric so 
forcefully that its power is diminished. Rather than looking for instance to President 
George W Bush’s response to the effects of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans – in 
which he promised massive federal aid and military assistance – Americans look to out-
comes and often find them wanting. Although President Obama – unlike his predecessors 
The American State and the Obama Presidency: A Preliminary Discussion 279 
– has not used the language mimicking war, he has nonetheless promised massive federal 
assistance in response to crises and marshalled attention in a focused way on specific 
problem promising the deployment of American state resources to address it. What has 
happened in the last decade is that this strategy has lost its edge. 
Part of the reason for this routinization effect of shock and awe is the development, in 
a historically consistent way, of a cultural backlash against government. Mobilized by the 
Tea Party activists and taken to Washington through elected Republican officeholders 
with Tea Party endorsement this populist sentiment fetters any use of American state re-
sources even in the face of palpable crises such as mass unemployment. President 
Obama’s carefully limited engagement in Libya illustrates this new constraint, while his 
American Jobs Bill is an attempt to harness this traditional state capacity. But a relentless 
opposition to the health care law, the subject of a Supreme Court review about its consti-
tutionality in 2012, illustrates how the constraints under which his deployment of Ameri-
can state capacities have deepened. Short of an unprovoked military attack on the US, us-
ing American state power decisively is harder and harder for the executive.  
Further trammelling Obama’s efforts to deploy American state resources is the on oc-
casion racist tinted hostility to him and his policies in American politics. This unexpected 
but enlarged incivility means the Obama presidency marks a dramatic moment of its own 
for the present and future development of the American state as an institution and set of 
resources in US society.  
Notes 
 
1 About which institution there has been an outpouring of important scholarly writing including Gerstle 
(2009), Balogh (2009), Banaszak (2010), Novak (2008), Edling (2003), Johnson (2007), Rockwell (2010), 
Skrentny (2006), Steinmo (2010). 
2 Skowronek (1982, 2009), Johnson (2007, 2009), Rohr (1986), Carpenter (2005, 2010). 
3 Though as Posner and Vermeule (2010) note this constraint is in practice muted most of the time. 
4 ANES data record growing number of respondents agreeing that “government is too powerful” (from 30 
per cent in 1964 to 39 per cent in 2000) and a declining number accepting that “government is not too 
strong” (down to 17 per cent in 2000 from 36 per cent in 1964). 
5 Moynihan and Ingraham (2010) p230. The authors seem unaware that the period of strong public support 
for the administrative system coincided with its role in upholding segregation – one reason for the favour-
able perception (King 2007); the collapse of segregation coincided with declining public support. 
6 “In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”First 
Inaugural Address 20 January 1981. 
7 A term embraced amongst others by David Brooks in his op-ed “The Testing Time,” New York Times Oc-
tober 7 2008. 
8 The TALF programme: Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. 
9 A complement to the October 2008 initiative TARP: Troubled Asset Relief Program. 
10 John Authors: “The Short View“ Financial Times 19 March 2009: “for now, shock and awe rules.” 
11 Quoted from testimony by Bernanke to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis In-
quiry Report, New York: Public Affairs Publishers, January 2011, p354.  
12 By the time of this November announcement the federal government has taken on close to $7.8 trillion of 
direct and indirect financial obligations, a sum equivalent to half of the US’s GNP. 
13 The US Supreme Court has issued memorable decisions knocking back executive power at key moments 
such as the decision against President Harry Truman’s efforts to nationalize a steel company for the Ko-
rean War: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952). 
14 Mettler (2010, 2011) 
15 Murakawa (2008). 
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16 Light (2003). 
17 Lieberman (2003). 
18 Krippner (2011). These strengths remain despite the August 5 downgrade by Standard and Poor of US 
Treasuries to AA+ from AAA rating. 
19 Of the $700bn the US Treasury drew down only $475bn. This was used as follows: $245bn supporting 
banks (including some non-US based banks), $151bn to support American International Group (AIG) and 
auto firms, $1bn for the housing market, and $17bn on a range of credit support programs including secu-
rities backed by credit cards. Most of this has been recouped. Gillian Tett: Tarp shows that US can break 
political deadlock, Financial Times, 13 May 2011. 
20 Friedberg (2000), Sanders (2000).  
21 Posner and Vermeule 2010: 10. 
22 Hamilton and Sutton (1989) p34; and see King and Lieberman (2009). 
23 Posner and Vermeule (2010) p11. 
24 Cited in Kennedy (1999), p134. 
25 Skowronek (1982). 
26 Greta Krippner writes that while “policymakers [in the state] are not presumed to share the same objec-
tives, what they hold in common.. is the set of problems to which they are responding” (2011: 23). 
27 Brinkley (1995). 
28 Galambos (1987), Aberbach and Peterson (2005). 
29 Pierson and Skocpol (2007); Jacobs and King (2009). 
30 Tulis (1988). 
31 Pierson (2007) p19. 
32 For an introduction to the vast scholarly literature on the US presidency see the excellent essays in Ed-
wards III and Howell (2009). And see Pious (2008). 
33 Nettl (1968), King and Lieberman (2009). 
34 See Ziblatt (2006). 
35 Among an extensive literature on polarization see McCarty et al (2006), and Lee (2009). 
36 Balogh (2009) and Rockwell (2010). 
37 Jacobs and Skocpol (2010). 
38 For the background to such tax expenditures see Mettler (2011). 
39 Calmes (2011). 
40 Jacobs and King (2010). 
41 EJ Dionne “How much has Obama learned?” Washington Post 12 September 2011. 
42 King (2007), King and Smith (2005, 2011). 
43 B. Sparrow (1996) and J. Sparrow (2011). 
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